




THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF STIGMA IN 
HEALTH CARE SETTINGS 
 





There is a well recognised relationship between stigma, 
prejudice and discrimination and the notion of those 
groups and individuals who are stigmatised becoming 
socially excluded (Social Exclusion Unit, 1998). As such 
socially excluded groups and individuals are lost to the 
binding force of communities, this fragments and weakens 
society as a whole (Social Exclusion Unit, 1999). 
Furthermore, there is growing concern that many socially 
excluded individuals turn to illicit drugs, alcohol and 
crime in response to their plight and this leads to a further 
weakening of social ties, and in turn to an increase in 
victimisation (Social Exclusion Unit, 2000). Stigma itself is a 
damaging and destructive term, which usually carries a 
negative semantic, and few would openly admit to being 
stigmatising in their social interactions. However, from the 
extent of marginalised groups that are noted in our society, 
it is clear that there must be many individuals and 
institutions that contribute to discriminatory practices, 
either consciously or subconsciously. In this chapter, we 
are concerned with stigma in health care settings, 
                                                 
1 This chapter reports on research undertaken by Tom Mason and 
Elizabeth Mason-Whitehead. It was presented as a paper at Chester by 
Tom Mason. 
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particularly in relation to the roles that professionals 
exercise in the stigmatising process, both in terms of its 
creation and its perpetuation. As we believe that stigma is 
fundamentally a social construction, albeit with a 
recognised practical impact, we will analyse stigma in 





Social constructionism is a term that is bandied around 
academic circles with a frequency that belies its fuller 
understanding. It is a popular closing retort in intellectual 
“ping-pong” argumentation to state that “it’s not real, it’s 
socially constructed” and, if propounded with enough 
dismissive finesse, this will usually leave other 
interlocutors flummoxed. However, we ought not to 
become either too smug regarding this or too disdainful; as 
Berger & Luckman (1967, p. 13) put it: “the man in the 
street inhabits a world that is ‘real’ to him, albeit in 
different degrees, and he ‘knows’, with different degrees of 
confidence, that this world possesses such and such 
characteristics. The philosopher, of course, will raise 
questions about the ultimate status of both this ‘reality’ 
and this ‘knowledge’”. Berger & Luckman, as sociologists, 
claim to be on a rung somewhere between the man in the 
street and the philosopher and we, as nurses, claim to be 
on a rung somewhere between the lay person and Berger & 
Luckman. There are a number of elements to be dealt with 
in our quest to understand the nature of social 








Given that Berger & Luckman have established that both 
the lay person and the philosopher will have different 
degrees of understanding as to the status of what 
constitutes reality, and also that all readers of these words 
will at least be on the lay rung of understanding, we will 
briefly outline the perspectives of two philosophers on the 
nature of reality. René Descartes (1596-1650), often called 
the father of modern philosophy, was born in the Touraine 
region of France and, following an education in the 
scholastic and humanistic traditions, worked mainly in the 
field of mathematics. Turning to philosophy, Descartes was 
concerned that what he perceived, in short his reality, 
could be doubted. He claimed that he had no way of telling 
that what he perceived was not a dream, an illusion or a 
hallucination, and might not be reality. He doubted 
everything and decided to deconstruct the world by 
hypothesising an all-deceiving evil genius that confused 
and confounded him at every stage of his thinking. This 
deconstruction took him back in his thinking until he was 
at the point at which he could state his “Cogito, ergo sum” 
proposition (usually translated as “I think, therefore I 
am”). The deceiving genius pushed him to this first 
conclusion in rebuilding his concept of the world; that is, if 
Descartes perceived something, anything at all - a dream, 
illusion or hallucination - he must therefore exist. From this 
starting point, he rebuilt his concept of the world up to, 
and including, the point of being able to prove the 
existence of God, to his own satisfaction (Descartes, 1637, 
1641/1967). 
The second philosopher was Plato (427-347 BCE), who 
was an Athenian Greek aristocrat and devoted follower of 
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Socrates. In his central work, the Republic, Plato sets out 
how an ideal society, or an approximation to it, might be 
justly ruled by philosophers acquiring political power. The 
most potent image in the Republic is the analogy of the 
cave, now fondly known as Plato’s cave, in which he asks 
the reader to imagine a person born in a cave, fixed to the 
wall, with no knowledge of the existence of the outside of 
the cave. Each night, our incumbent sees shadows and 
flickering lights on the opposite wall and this is his only 
perception of reality. One night, he is taken down from his 
fixed position on the wall opposite to the shadows and 
lights and taken out of the cave to be shown a fire at the 
cave entrance, with people dancing around it, which was 
producing the silhouettes on the cave wall. Thus, Plato 
suggests that the cave dweller now has two realities and, 
having travelled further afield, with new experiences along 
the way, he acquires multiple realities. Thus, reality may 
begin with an internal perception of the self, but also 
includes a perception of the other, which forms the 




Knowledge is knowledge of something, and to know is to 
suggest that this something is understood in relation to 
other things in the world. All things in the world share a 
relation with other things and Foucault (1970) referred to 
this as “the order of things”. However, there are different 
approaches to knowledge, with “scientific” being merely 
one. The word “science” is derived from the Latin scientia, 
which, in turn, is derived from sciens, the present participle 
of scire, which means “to know”. Scientific knowledge has 
credence over other types of knowledge, but only for some 
people. Some believe that other modes of knowledge are 
superior to scientific knowledge. These other modes of 
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knowledge would include the authoritarian mode, which 
refers to those who are socially or politically defined as 
being eligible to produce knowledge: “These may be 
oracles in tribal societies, archbishops in theocratic 
societies, kings in monarchical societies and individuals 
occupying scientific roles in technocratic societies” 
(Nachmias & Nachmias, 1981, p. 5). Other examples of this 
type of knowledge would include the Pope’s undisputed 
religious knowledge for Catholics and, for Russians, the 
Soviet Academy of Sciences, which decreed that 
probability was a non-scientific approach to theory 
building, in an (abortive) attempt to resolve the conflict 
between the determinism of dialectical materialism and the 
theory of probability. In the authoritarian mode, there is a 
close relationship between the knowledge seeker and the 
knowledge producer, in which the former requires a high 
level of confidence in the latter’s ability to produce 
knowledge. Although this type of knowledge can be 
refuted, it requires a large number of refutations before it is 
replaced by another type of authority (Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 1981). 
A second type of knowledge is the mystical mode, in 
which people importune knowledge from prophets, 
divines, gods, mediums and other varied supernatural 
powers. In one sense, this type of knowledge is similar to 
the authoritarian mode, but differs as it depends on the 
manifestation of supernatural indicators, as well as on the 
psychophysical state of the believer. The production of 
knowledge in this mode is usually accompanied by rituals 
and ceremonies, and confidence decreases as the number 
of disconfirmations increases. The third type of knowledge 
is the rationalistic mode, which involves the belief that all 
knowledge can be obtained through adherence to forms 
and rules of logic: “The underlying assumptions of 
rationalism are that (1) the human mind can apprehend the 
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world independently of observable phenomena and (2) 
that forms of knowledge exist that are prior to our 
experiences” (Nachmias & Nachmias, 1981, p.  5). So, the 
answer to the Zen question: “If a tree falls in a forest and 
there is no one there to hear it, does it make a sound?” is, 
for the rationalist: “Yes, it does”. In short, the rationalist 
mode is concerned with what must be true in principle and 
what is logically possible and permissible. 
 
Reality of Everyday Life 
 
Two founding fathers of sociology gave us an early 
indication of how to proceed in the quest to understand the 
reality of everyday life. Durkheim informs us that: “The 
first and most fundamental rule is to consider social facts 
as things” (1895/1938, p. 14) and Weber argues that: “Both 
for sociology in the present sense, and for history, the 
object of cognition is the subjective meaning-complex of 
action” (1921/1947, p. 101). These two statements first 
appear to be contradictory, as the former refers to facts and 
things as objective elements and the latter indicates the 
subjective interpretation of human behaviour. However, it 
is a fact that society does have this dual character “in terms 
of objective facticity and subjective meaning that makes its 
‘reality sui generis’” (Berger & Luckman, 1967, p. 30). Thus, 
in the creation of stigma, the interesting question is: How 
does the subjective interpretation of the stigmata, i.e. the 
Jew, the Black, the Catholic, the gypsy or the disabled, 
become objective facticities, i.e. greedy, lazy, subversive, 
sub-human or blameworthy, so that they are perceived as 
inferior? We will begin to address this question with a brief 
look at three elements: (a) the here and now; (b) the 
concept of “I”; and (c) the zones of relevance. 
In terms of multiple realities, we can note that there is 
one that is considered to be the paramount reality: that is, 
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the reality of everyday life. Being conscious creates an 
awareness that is at its most focused in everyday life. 
Everyday life imposes itself on our conscious mind in an 
imperative manner, as we must deal with it in the here and 
now. In being awake, we apprehend ourselves as being in 
a constant now, a moment of consciousness that is ever-
changing into the next now, and each future now lines up 
to pass into our instance of awareness to become the past. 
Consciousness is always conscious of something: that is, it 
is directed towards things in everyday life. This 
consciousness intends towards something from the 
position of “I” (the first person singular, me). I am 
conscious of things in the world and am aware that others 
may be also, from their respective “I” positions, but it is “I” 
(of me) that apprehends my everyday life, knowing that 
others do so as well. Finally, it is said that, in my 
apprehending of the world, I do so in terms of zones of 
relevance. The closest zone to me is that which I am 
directly involved in, is easily accessible to me and is open 
to my influence and manipulation. Further out are other 
zones that are less accessible to me, that I have little 
interest in and only partial influence over. The furthest 
zone of relevance to me is that which is not accessible to 
me. I have no influence over it and my interest in it is 
merely potential: that is, I may one day be able to have 
some manipulation within it. Thus, the reality of everyday 




We share the world with others, and we experience these 
others in different ways. “The most important experience 
of others takes place in the face-to-face situation, which is 
the prototypical case of social interaction. All other cases 
are derivatives of it” (Berger & Luckman, 1967, p. 43). This 
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face-to-face situation is shared with each other and, as I 
apprehend the other, thus he apprehends me. We are in a 
prime “I and Thou” relation that dominates our experience 
(Buber, 1922/1937). Although I know more about me, my 
history and my memory than I do about the other, the face-
to-face situation remains dominant. This is because there is 
a constant interchange of expressivity between us as we 
interact. I smile, he smiles; I frown, he stops smiling; and so 
on. All my expressions are oriented towards him and all 
his to me. It is true that we may misinterpret expressions; 
nevertheless, it is only here in the face-to-face situation that 
the other’s subjectivity is emphatically “close”. Berger & 
Luckman claim that all other forms of relating to the other 
are, in varying degrees, “remote”. In my interaction with 
the other, what he is is available to me as I focus on him. 
However, what “I” am is not quite so available to me, as I 
must stop and reflect on what “I” am to make it available 
to me. Thus, what the other is in the face-to-face situation 
is continuous and pre-reflective. 
As I interact with the other in a face-to-face situation, 
I apprehend him by means of typificatory schemes. For 
example, I may apprehend the other as “an American”, “a 
good guy”, “a fool”, “a drug addict”, etc., and all these 
typifications will influence how my interaction will 
continue. Similarly, the other is also engaged in typifying 
me and a sort of ongoing negotiation of typificatory 
schemes continues throughout. Furthermore, typificatory 
schemes can be negotiated at a pre-arranged level, as in a 
bargaining process between buyer and seller. Thus, 
encounters with others in everyday life are typical in two 
senses; the other is apprehended as a type and the situation 
itself may be typical. Typifications of social encounters 
become progressively more anonymous the further away 
they are from the face-to-face situation, although they do 
continue. This means that when I apprehend the other in a 
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face-to-face encounter I may, although I also may not, turn 
my attention to other contemporaries who are not in the 
face-to-face situation. “Anonymity increases as I go from 
the former [face-to-face] to the latter [not face-to-face], 
because the anonymity of the typifications by means of 
which I apprehend fellowmen in face-to-face situations is 
constantly ‘filled in’ by the multiplicity of vivid symptoms 
referring to a concrete human being” (Berger & Luckman, 
1967, p. 47). Although there are obvious differences in my 
experiences of contemporaries in the world, it is the extent 
of anonymity or “closeness” that will influence how I 
typify them. This appears to be a basis for the 
stigmatisation process, whereby “the Black”, “the White”, 
“the Hindu”, “the Muslim”, “the Catholic”, “the 
Protestant”, “the disabled”, and so on, become typified. 
Social reality is thus constructed through a continuous 
scheme of typifications that become progressively more 
anonymous the further away they are from the “here and 
now” of the face-to-face situation. Berger & Luckman 
(1967, p. 48) sum this up succinctly: “Social structure is the 
sum total of these typifications and of the recurrent 
patterns of interaction established by means of them. As 
such, social structure is an essential element of the reality 
of everyday life”.  
 
Language and Knowledge 
 
Language and knowledge lie at the heart of social 
constructionism and the central theme to be dealt with 
concerns human expressivity. Human expression can be 
objectified, by which means both the producer and the 
recipient can share a common understanding. This is 
achieved through products of human activity that are 
available to all in the shared experience. For example, we 
can all recognise the bodily indices of the subjective 
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experience of anger through facial expressions, posture, 
shaking fists, etc., and through verbal signs which might 
include hissing, grunting, screaming, etc. Once outside the 
face-to-face situation, the physical and verbal signs 
dissipate. However, the human expression of anger can be 
transmitted through a sign system. For example, if the 
angry person leaves an axe buried in my dining-room table 
or paints a skull and crossbones sign on my front door, 
they express their feeling of anger to me and to anyone else 
that may see them. Language itself can be defined as a 
system of vocal signs and is recognised as the most 
important sign system of human society (Berger & 
Luckman, 1967). Language is rooted in the here and now, 
but can be detached from it when one is shouting across a 
distance, speaking on the phone or radio, or even when 
writing (a second degree sign system). In the face-to-face 
situation, language shares a synchrony with both parties, 
speaker and listener, as at almost the same instance the 
speaker speaks and the listener listens to what is being 
spoken. Furthermore, language is capable of transcending 
the reality of everyday life and can span discrete spheres of 
reality. For example, it can interpret the meaning of a 
dream and explain it linguistically in our wide-awake 
world. 
Language builds up semantic areas or zones of 
meaning for us that are circumscribed in a linguistic sense, 
and marks out coordinates of relevance for us. These fields 
are determined by our geographical and historical 
experience and, of course, differ for each individual. What 
is relevant to one person may not be relevant to another. 
This accumulation of relevant semantic fields constitutes 
what is known as our social stock of knowledge and 
includes both what is known and the limitations of that 
knowledge. The social stock of knowledge differentiates 
everyday reality through degrees of familiarity, as there 
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are areas of life in which many people are extremely 
knowledgeable and other areas that they know very little 
about. It is the social stock of knowledge that provides the 
information for the process of typification that is 
undertaken routinely in everyday life. One event or 
situation, including the meeting of a person, is searched for 
in the social stock of knowledge to establish if it, or they, 
are typical of a previous experience or encounter, and this 
provides the basis of the potential response to it or them. 
Thus, if the social stock of knowledge only contains a 
negative experience of, say, meeting a sociologist and a 
situation occurs in which you are introduced to another 
sociologist, then this is likely to be typified as negative, all 




All human activity has the potential to become 
habitualised. This patterning of behaviour is 
psychologically economical and will both reduce our need 
to deliberate on choices of action and free up our minds for 
new innovations. Remember, or imagine, the difficulties of 
learning to drive a car and attempting to coordinate the 
brakes, accelerator, clutch, gears, mirrors and steering. Yet 
very soon the process of driving becomes a habit, and most 
drivers do not need to concentrate on the intricacies of the 
driving procedures – though hopefully not to the level of 
being careless! Notwithstanding the dangerous aspects of 
this example, we can see that the habitualisation of this 
action reduces our choices in the way that we drive as, 
over time, we come to drive the way that we do, and this 
allows us to think about other things as we drive. 
Importantly, the meanings attached to this habitualised 
behaviour are retained and become embedded as routines 
in our general stock of knowledge. It is not only human 
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behaviour, such as driving a car or dressing in the 
morning, that becomes habitualised, but also social 
interactions, such as greetings and departures, having tea 
or coffee with another, or attending a football match as a 
hooligan. These human actions become valued to both 
ourselves and the significant others in the social group to 
which we belong. Habitualisation precedes 
institutionalisation. 
The vast amount of our human experience passes into 
our subconscious or unconscious minds and only a very 
small amount is held in our consciousness. If this were not 
the case, we would soon become “frozen” in inaction. 
Human experience, as it occurs, soon becomes sedimented 
in our recollections as memories, and we recognise these as 
our biography, as well as those of others as their history. 
Inter-subjective sedimentation occurs when an experience 
has been objectified in a sign system, predominantly a 
linguistic one, and only when this occurs can the meaning 
that it is endowed with be transmitted to others: i.e., the 
next generation. This becomes the basis of tradition. For 
example, both the hunting and the anti-hunting lobbies 
hold their traditions as valuable, with the “experience” of 
hunting being inter-subjectively sedimented. This is 
despite the fact that few in either group would actually 
have the basic experience of hunting for survival in its true 
sense, or of being hunted themselves. A bond is formed 
within both groups, based on the sedimented experiences 
embedded in the traditions of previous generations. These 
transmitted sedimentations are institutionalised and lead 
to those with their respective values performing a role in 
accordance with those beliefs: i.e., the hunters dress up and 
ride horses, with hounds and horns, and the anti-hunters 
engage in behaviours that are designed to try to stop them. 
We would not expect that a member of one of these groups 
would act in accordance with the beliefs of the other, 
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although this may be both wished for and striven for. If 
these sedimented experiences, values and traditions 
involve what we may consider to be prejudice and stigma, 
then we can now appreciate how they become 




It would be rare for someone to state that they are 
prejudiced, that their belief system may be false, that their 
behaviour is discriminatory or that their actions are wrong; 
however, such insightful revelation would be the most 
important step on the road to change. Legitimation is the 
process by which the chances of this self-reflection are 
curtailed and Berger & Luckman (1967) refer to it as a 
second-order objectification of meaning. By this, they mean 
that legitimation produces new meanings, which 
incorporate the original meanings already formed from the 
institutionalisation processes. The second-order meanings 
are integrated into the first-order meanings to form a 
totality of meaning as an overall symbolic structure. These 
are referred to as symbolic universes. As Berger & 
Luckman (1967, p. 113) state: “These are bodies of 
theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of 
meaning and encompass the institutional order in a 
symbolic totality”. This allows us to appreciate symbolic 
universes such as “the police”, “the army” and “the 
hospital”. In taking the term “the police” as an example, 
we can see that it clearly comprises thousands of 
individuals who learn and operate the rules of policing. 
However, we can also appreciate “the police” as a single 
entity, in the sense of “That is what ‘the police’ do” or 
“That’s ‘the police’ for you”. “The police” in Britain are 
often said to be institutionally racist and we should now be 
in a position to see how this tradition, if it is true, is 
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maintained. For this to become legitimated within “the 
police”, the individual practices must become absorbed as 
a total overall symbolic universe into that which becomes 
known as “What ‘the police’ are”. Legitimation governs the 
here and now and also governs the institution through its 
collective history. In social constructionist terms, this 
explains why such negative practices as institutional 
racism are perpetuated; but it also explains why positive 
practices are maintained. We will now move on to focus 
more closely on the second strand of our chapter, and that 




In its simplest sense, stigma is concerned with some form 
of mark that carries a disgrace and has negative 
connotations attached to it. Stigmata may be attached to a 
circumstance, quality or person, and has its Christian 
heritage in the marks on Christ’s body following the 
crucifixion. There have been many writers on stigma, from 
many disciplines such as philosophy, theology and 
anthropology, and the five that we are about to outline are 
those that we consider to be the most relevant to our work 




Michel Foucault, the French intellectual, philosopher and 
historian of ideas, produced a central thesis on the notion 
of difference in his work Madness and Civilisation 
(1961/1967). Foucault argued that stigma had its 
etymological roots in religion, not only by referring to the 
marks of the crucifixion, but more importantly by marking 
out a difference. He suggested that early Christian society 
required the identification of difference based on that 
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between those in God’s favour and those who had fallen 
out of His good grace. Those that were considered to have 
fallen from favour were afflicted with a mark to identify 
them, and this mark, according to Foucault, was leprosy. 
He developed the thesis that, during the first ten centuries 
after the birth of Christ, leprosy defined difference through 
this highly visible mark from God and this allowed all 
manner of actions to be delivered to those with this 
condition. Throughout Europe at this period, leprosy was 
rife and lepers were colonised in lazar houses. Lazar refers 
to a poor and diseased person and, in particular, a leper. 
Over centuries, through the forced process of colonisation, 
leprosy in Europe was eventually eradicated. Foucault 
argues that this purge left a moral vacuum in society, 
whereby the difference between “them” (those out of 
God’s favour) and “us” (those in God’s favour) could no 
longer be seen via the mark of leprosy. Such a lack of a 
visible difference is threatening to society and could lead to 
all manner of fractures to the social bond. This appears 
closely related to a type of knowledge mentioned above 
and forms a reality for those involved. 
For Foucault, the creation of difference through a 
visible sign was central to the idea of creating a “them” 
and an “us”, which makes “us” feel safe. The lack of a 
“them” is threatening, as those out of God’s favour cannot 
be identified amongst “us”. This leads to social paranoia, 
as seen in witch-hunts, and accusations abound, damaging 
social ties. Foucault argued that, following the purge of 
leprosy, the social vacuum that was created was filled by 
madness. The lazar houses across Europe were filled by the 
mentally ill. Whereas, prior to this, madness was a 
community affair, popularly seen in terms of the “village 
idiot”, the mentally ill now began to be excluded from 
society as the new “them”. They were forced into colonies, 
which later became institutions, and in effect forced on to a 
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“journey”. Foucault made good use of this notion of 
“journey” and employed Hieronymus Bosch’s famous 
painting of the “Ship of Fools” (ca. 1494) as a symbol 
representing the idea of the mentally ill of that time being 
put on to ships to sail the canals of Europe. The ships were 
constantly in motion, moving “the problem” on to the next 
village or town in a perpetual movement. For Foucault, 
once they embarked on their “journey”, there was no point 
of disembarkation and we can see much of modern 
psychiatry in these terms. For many patients with mental 
health problems, once they engage with modern 
psychiatric services, they are forced on a journey of “cure”, 




Putting to one side simplistic notions of deviance, 
essentially based on the statistical definition of that which 
deviates from a norm or average, Howard Becker (1963) 
incorporated certain social elements into the concept. 
Becker’s work on deviance is closely allied to stigma, as he 
also shelved the notion of the pathology of deviance as 
correlating to “diseased” as opposed to “healthy”. He also 
disliked the sociological model of deviance, which 
predominantly saw some elements of society as promoting 
stability (“functional”), whilst others promoted instability 
(“dysfunctional”). He believed that society comprised 
many groups and sub-groups of people, each having their 
own sets of rules and sanctions for any transgressions. 
Individuals could belong to many different groups and 
could function within them, even though they might well 
be at odds with their values. For example, a person could 
belong to a respectable organisation and could also belong 
to a group of football hooligans. Members of any group 
who transgress the rules of that group are not a 
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homogenous set, but merely deviant within the rule 
structure of the group to which they belong. Thus, the 
members of the group identify what it is that will be 
stigmatised. For the gang of football hooligans, it may be 
that to show compassion for an injured victim is a 
deviation from the norm of the group and that this will 
therefore be stigmatised accordingly. This, again, is the 
reality of everyday life. 
Becker defined deviance in terms of how it was 
constructed by the social groups that formed the rules 
whose infraction constituted what they considered to be 
deviant. Becker puts it this way: “From this point of view, 
deviance is not a quality of the act that a person commits, 
but rather a consequence of the application by others of 
rules and sanctions to an ‘offender’. The deviant is one to 
whom that label has successfully been applied; deviant 
behaviour is behaviour that people so label” (1963, p. 9). 
Becker’s work located deviance at a social level and 
claimed that various media communications were part of 
this social character. Once so labelled, deviant groups also 
developed certain mechanisms of a social character to 
reinforce and maintain their status. These included such 
concepts as common fate, rationalising their position, self-
justifying strategies, and a history on which to pin their 
experiences. Although Becker used the deviant behaviour 
of using marijuana as an example of deviancy, we can 
substitute any of the socially recognised stigmatising 




Ervin Goffman, in his seminal book Stigma: Notes on the 
Management of Spoiled Identity (1963), defined stigma in 
terms of our personal knowledge of the person before us. 
He stated that: “While the stranger is present before us, 
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evidence can arise of his possessing an attribute that makes 
him different from others in the category of persons 
available for him to be, and of a less desirable kind – in the 
extreme a person who is quite thoroughly bad, or 
dangerous, or weak. He is thus reduced in our minds from 
a whole and usual person to a tainted one. Such an 
attribute is a stigma” (p. 12). He outlined three different 
types of stigma: first, abominations of the body, such as 
various physical deformities; second, blemishes of 
individual character, which may be perceived as including 
weakness of will, being domineering, having unnatural 
passions, treacherousness, holding rigid beliefs and 
dishonesty; and third, the tribal stigmas of race, nation and 
religion. Although Goffman’s text remains central to any 
work on stigma, he has been criticised as presenting too 
narrow a version. For example, Page (1984) argues that 
“physical deformities” is too restrictive in terms of 
suggesting deprivation pertaining to congenital 
abnormalities or malformations of human structures. 
Similarly, “blemishes of individual character” suggests a 
behavioural manifestation and Page argues that the term 
“conduct” more suitably fits this dimension of stigma. 
Notwithstanding these criticisms, Goffman’s 
understanding of stigma locates it from the viewpoint of 
society and shows how the individual can emerge socially 
as different. His concern with appreciating how and why 
some members of society choose to stigmatise a particular 
social group is important, as it also focuses on the 
perceptions of the stigmatised themselves. Thus, he 
identifies a relationship between those that stigmatise and 
those that are stigmatised. The tension that is created 
within this relationship is easily noted when a physically 
deformed person walks down the street; either he is stared 
at as a spectacle or eyes are quickly averted. Both 
responses lock both individuals into a self-reinforcing 
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process of stigmatisation. There are a large number of 
vignettes in Goffman’s text that are based on the personal 
experiences of stigmatised individuals and it is suggested 
that it is these personal accounts that ground the book in 
the life world of the marginalised “Other”. He clearly sees 
stigma in terms of a two-way process, in which the 
stigmatising and the stigmatised are trapped in a value-
laden course of interaction. It is interesting to note that, 
when the stranger (to be stigmatised) becomes known to us 
on a personal level, Goffman suggests that they largely 
become de-stigmatised. This resonates with our 
experiences in modern day society of racial and religious 
tensions between many groups of people who are not 
known to each other on a personal level. It also resonates 
with the grouping of people together, such as “the 
disabled”; our perceptions of them when we know the 
person as an individual alters, and this is closely associated 
with the notion of typification outlined above. 
 
Jones, Farina, Hastorf, Markus, Miller, & Scott 
 
Edward Jones and his co-workers produced a text, from a 
social psychology perspective, entitled Social Stigma: The 
Psychology of Marked Relationships (1984). Using different 
language to Goffman, they stated that: “We intend to focus 
in this book on a particular category of social relationships 
– those in which one participant has a condition that is at 
least potentially discrediting. We shall be concerned with 
the cognitive and affective underpinnings of such 
relationships and with the behavioural problems they 
entail. We shall also be concerned with the course and 
development of such relationships over time” (p. 6).  This 
focused the work on the relationship between societal 
values and the perceptions of the marginalised individual 
as a devalued person. Therefore, it is concerned with the 
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feeling of stigma as perceived by vulnerable individuals, 
which in this context deals with personal responses, such 
as fear, anger, worthlessness, depression, etc. The 
emotional impact of these engendered feelings, whether or 
not explicitly evoked by societal responses to the stigmata, 
is implicitly felt as a corollary of those social expectations. 
The result of this, according to Jones et al., is the 
development of a mental strategy to deal with the social 
implications of the stigma. These were termed the “six 
dimensions”. 
These dimensions were, first, concealability, which refers 
to the extent to which the stigmata can be hidden and deals 
with the questions of to what extent its visibility is 
controllable or the wish to control it desirable. Clearly, a 
facial disfigurement is difficult to hide unless the person 
becomes socially isolated, and an unwanted pregnancy can 
only be hidden until the growing abdomen reveals its 
presence. The second dimension is course, which is 
concerned with the pattern of change in relation to social 
expectations of the stigmatised condition and examines 
what the anticipated social consequences of the outcome 
are. For example, with a terminal illness, there are a set of 
social relations that surround the person as they move 
towards their death which will affect conversations, 
particularly regarding the future. Third, disruptiveness, 
which refers to the extent to which the condition blocks or 
hampers either the social interaction of the stigmatised 
person or their communication with the social network: 
stigmatised conditions do affect the social network to one 
degree or another, and will govern what that person does 
and who they do it with. The fourth dimension refers to 
aesthetic qualities, which involves the signs and symbols of 
the condition that make the possessor repellent, ugly or 
upsetting. Burns, amputations, facial disfigurements, etc., 
may evoke a negative reaction in the perceiver, whilst 
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more hidden conditions do not, and this creates an 
emotional reaction. Fifth is origin, which refers to the 
aetiology of the circumstances that led to the stigmatised 
condition in relation to the accounting of blame and 
involves identifying who holds responsibility for it. If the 
responsibility for a condition can be located as the person 
themselves, then they are more likely to be stigmatised for 
it. The final dimension is peril, which refers to the extent to 
which the condition poses any social danger and, if so, 
how imminent or serious it is. For example, a person with 
HIV/AIDS may be stigmatised as posing a social danger, 
as the perception is one of contagion. Again, we can see in 
the work of Jones et al. that stigma is centrally a social 




Graham Scambler, writing in the UK, has made, and 
continues to make, a significant contribution to our 
understanding of stigma. The personal anxieties 
concerning stigmatised people’s attempts to cope with 
their conspicuous positions in society is enlightened by his 
identification of enacted and felt stigma. Focusing his work 
on epilepsy, Scambler claims that enacted stigma produces 
very profound and damaging experiences when the person 
with epilepsy recalls being discriminated against. Enacted 
stigma refers to the stigmatised person being identified as 
such and then living the experience of stigmatisation. They 
are, in effect, “outed” and then live according to the 
expectations that society has of them. Scambler argues that 
the powerful force of the label “epileptic” creates a pattern 
of expectations, which the person then lives by. Felt 
stigma, on the other hand, refers to the shame that the 
person feels towards being associated with the diagnosis 
“epileptic”. Furthermore, there is a fear of being 
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discriminated against simply on the grounds of this label 
and Scambler goes on to state that “the sense of felt stigma 
is so strong that people with epilepsy typically do their 
utmost to maintain secrecy about their symptoms and the 
diagnostic label: they disclose only when it strikes them as 
prudent or necessary” (1997, p. 176). We can see that 
keeping the label hidden would reduce the likelihood of 
encountering enacted stigma, but we can also see that felt 
stigma would be more disruptive to the lives of the 
stigmatised. 
Scambler has examined a number of medical 
conditions that create stigmatisation, and these include 
rectal cancer, HIV/AIDS, psoriasis and severe burns. 
Analysing these conditions in the framework of health and 
illness, he shows how these “stigmatising conditions can 
be defined as conditions that set their possessors apart 
from ‘normal’ people, that mark them as socially 
unacceptable or inferior beings” (1997, p. 187). Illness 
involves deviance and stigma on two levels. Firstly, by the 
individual deviating from the social norm and being 
labelled as “sick”; and secondly, by having a condition that 
is socially uncomfortable to the remainder of society. These 
conditions, and there are many more, inevitably require 
contact with the medical professionals who are attempting 
to provide a quality care service, and the encounter with 
these health professionals is crucial in the stigmatising 
process. We will now look at a number of examples of this 
in health care settings. 
 
Health Care Settings 
 
Health care settings are communities with characteristics 
that in some fundamental and profound way set them 
apart from the rest of society. They are places where 
vulnerable, injured, damaged and hurt members of society 
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intersect with professional people, whose purpose is to aid, 
assist and care for them. These settings can embrace any 
social situation in which those who have a health care need 
are administered some form of medical attention, in its all-
inclusive sense. Outside the home, these can range from a 
General Practitioner’s surgery to a field hospital in a war 
zone. All of those people who need this medical attention 
present some vulnerable attribute, which has tarnished 
their image of themselves in some way. The vulnerability 
of patients in health care settings, because of their 
“difference”, all too frequently leads to their being subject 
to and experiencing stigmatisation both from the wider 
society and from the health care professionals.  
It should be remembered that the impact and force of 
stigmas change over time. Our prejudicial views alter 
according to our social norms, which are rooted in the 
particular period of history in which we are living. For 
example, in the 1980s the gay community suffered an 
onslaught of the stigmatisation process. Of course, the gay 
community has always felt excluded and alienated to 
varying degrees, but the HIV/AIDS epidemic brought a 
resurgence of stigma from the wider society. Stigma, of 
whatever origin, is rooted in fear and this fear all too 
frequently stems from an ignorance of the “affliction”. As 
society’s knowledge base of HIV/AIDS has developed, 
and as it is no longer a disease that exclusively targets 
homosexuals, society’s moral panic has somewhat fallen. 
We are, in theory at least, a society which is becoming 
more integrated, and as those people with potential and 
anticipated stigmatising conditions, as described by 
Scambler (1997), increasingly live and work in mainstream 
society, their experiences of being stigmatised should fall 
(Goffman, 1963; Whitehead, 2001). We will now discuss 
three areas of stigmatisation in health care settings and, 
despite their unique characteristics, they illustrate a 
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number of fundamental properties that are common to all 
stigmas. 
 
The Stigma of Congenital Abnormalities 
 
Farrell & Corrin (2001) outline the case of stigma and 
congenital abnormalities. They begin their chapter with the 
historical impact of stigma in relation to congenital 
abnormalities and show how this has changed over time. 
For example, in early Greek times congenital abnormalities 
were seen as a sign of divine retributive intervention for 
sins committed in a previous life, and in early Roman 
civilisation there is some evidence that statutes existed 
which instructed the head of the family to kill their child if 
it was born with a deformity. Furthermore, in medieval 
and Tudor times, babies born with congenital 
abnormalities were seen as changelings: that is, the devil’s 
substitutes for human children. We are also told that 
Martin Luther, the Protestant reformer, considered the 
disabled child to be the devil incarnate and recommended 
terminating the baby’s life. 
The authors go on to discuss the great expectations that 
surround the impending birth of a child, with the many 
social interactions that accompany it and create an air of 
anticipation at this time. The shattering of these 
expectations is profound if the baby is born with a 
congenital abnormality, and the reactions of professionals, 
then of parents, and then of the social network, reinforce 
negative perceptions of the deformity. At the point of birth, 
the two main questions that parents ask are (a) “Is it a boy 
or a girl?” and (b) “Is it alright?” Professionals, doctors and 
midwives who are unable to respond positively to the 
latter question are faced with the dilemma of how to 
answer and the inevitable hesitancy and avoidance begin 
the process of stigmatisation. Parents lose their prime 
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expectation of a “healthy baby” and give way to a 
perception of weakness, vulnerability and pity. Their self-
image as “good parents” is challenged and leads to intense 
psychological trauma. Parental feelings range from 
ambivalence to revulsion in the aftermath of this. The 
social network is altered, as some family members and 
social friends become hesitant at approaching a family 
with a child with an abnormality, as they do not know 
what to say or do. Many parents of a child born with such 
a deformity may seek the company of others in a similar 
situation, often in the form of support groups. In any 
event, the social network is altered, and there are many 
reports of awkward encounters in social settings when a 
baby with congenital abnormalities is thrust upon an 
unsuspecting stranger. 
Although modern-day surgery can correct or lessen the 
impact of such congenital abnormalities, it is often 
unhelpful to the parents to dismiss the deformity with 
unrealistic positive comments regarding the future. 
Although these are designed to help, they rarely do. Farrell 
& Corrin (2001) argue that stigma can be lessened by 
reflection, recognising the individuality of the child and 
the family, focusing on the personal attributes of the child, 
engaging in active listening and forming a therapeutic 
relations framework. Society sees the child with congenital 
abnormalities as a stranger, both in terms of being 
unknown and also deviating from the norm, and 
constructs a response to this, which is largely negative. 
Only by getting to “know” the child and its relation to the 
disability, and in turn its relation to society, can the stigma 
be overcome. 
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Teenage Pregnancy, Stigma and Differential Provision of 
Health Care 
 
According to Jacono & Jacono (2001), teenage pregnancy is 
a major concern in most industrialised countries and, 
although it has long been considered “shameful” in 
Western society, its current “epidemic” is seen to have its 
roots in the “sexual revolution of the sixties”. The concern 
alluded to here involves social, moral and financial issues. 
The rates of teenage pregnancy are on the increase, with 
half a million reported each year in the USA and 20 per 
1000 teenage women giving birth in Britain (Jacono & 
Jacono, 2001). The social concerns surround the breakdown 
in social networks, as these teenagers lose an element of 
“freedom”, and the high rates of divorce, leading to an 
increase in single parents becoming socially isolated. The 
moral issue has its roots deep in religious traditions, the 
family and the sanctity of sex within marriage; those seen 
to have “succumbed” being deemed to have fallen from 
God’s grace. The financial issues largely involve the fact 
that approximately half of all teenage pregnant women go 
on welfare in the USA and 90% receive income support in 
Britain (Jacono & Jacono, 2001). There are, of course, other 
issues that are important for teenage pregnancies and these 
include higher death rates, lower birth weights and higher 
rates of psycho-physiological dysfunctions in the children 
of teenage mothers. 
Stigmatisation occurs through a process of 
victimisation, as the teenager is considered to be morally 
“weak-willed” in not resisting the drives and urges of male 
advances and her own passions. She is considered to be 
inferior in not being able to wait until marriage and 
ignorant in not taking precautions. She is regarded as 
being responsible for her condition and is viewed as 
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having to be fully accountable for her future. Whitehead 
(2001) argues that this leads to a form of “social death”. 
Teenage pregnant women are perceived as having “loose 
morals” and of being “over-sexed” and they can be seen as 
a mark of shame for family and friends. Parental reactions 
may include anger, deep feelings of disgrace and betrayal, 
and may even lead to the abandonment of the daughter, 
who can become ostracised and isolated, especially if the 
father of the pregnant teenager is no longer in the 
relationship. As Jacono & Jacono (2001, p. 229) point out: 
“Since there appear to be no social, religious, economic or 
cultural boundaries that it does not cross, it generates a 
great deal of fear in those who perceive themselves (or 
their loved ones) to be at risk for becoming part of this 
group”. Thus, the social construction of the stigma of 
teenage pregnancy is processed through the mediums of 




One does not automatically associate breastfeeding with 
stigma in the way that one would congenital abnormality 
or HIV/AIDS; however, Smale (2001) offers a sophisticated 
account of how this occurs in our society. There are 
cultural differences in breastfeeding in public, with Africa, 
Asia and Scandinavia largely accepting this practice, whilst 
in Britain it is largely unacceptable. In fact, Smale (2001) 
argues that breastfeeding in public in Britain appears to be 
less tolerated the further one travels from London, and she 
explains the process by which this natural practice 
becomes stigmatised. She focuses on two of the dimensions 
of Jones et al (1984), “origin” and “peril”, to show how this 
occurs. The visible signs of the stigmata are the damp 
stains from the nipples and the possibility of the related 
smell; millions of pads are sold each year to manage this. 
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The possibility of let-down as the baby ceases suckling, 
with arching streams of milk squirting from the breasts, is 
a visible and embarrassing sign. Noises, such as the 
gulping of milk by a hungry baby, betray the passage of 
body fluids, and even silent, or discreet, breastfeeding may 
provoke reactions in others. Smale (2001) sees the 
dimension of peril and breastfeeding, not as a direct threat 
to others, but as a challenge to the social order. The 
production of bare breasts in our society is culturally 
disallowed, unless in certain defined areas such as when 
sunbathing on the beach, and the management of transfer 
from invisible breasts to a bare breast being suckled is 
particularly difficult for women with twins or with large 
breasts. 
Smale (2001) gives us numerous accounts of women 
being asked not to feed their babies in public, being 
requested to go to the toilet to feed, being told it is “rude”, 
revolting or disgusting, and that the expulsion of all body 
fluids from orifices should be done in private. Smale 
argues that, although most of us like to eat out and do not 
mind being in the presence of others eating out, this does 
not always extend to babies breastfeeding. She also 
highlights how language and silence are employed in the 
social construction of the stigma of breastfeeding. 
“Journalists have compared public breastfeeding to the 
siting of urinals in bars or vomitaria in restaurants, and to 
self-medication (“shooting up”) by diabetics .... These 
powerful parallels reveal powerful meanings, just as the 
action of an irate shopkeeper – throwing dirty water over a 
mother and baby as they breastfed outside his shop – 
recalls that of someone separating copulating dogs” (p.  
239). In this very powerful chapter, Smale reveals how this 
natural and benign activity can become stigmatised 
through the social construction of the breast as belonging 
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to the domain of sex; thus, it should be kept hidden from 




We have been concerned throughout our work on stigma 
and social exclusion with how professional health care staff 
contribute towards the stigmatisation process and then 
perpetuate it in their practice. This is not to say that we 
believe that this process is often undertaken malevolently 
or deliberately, although occasionally this might well be so, 
but that it occurs unknowingly or inevitably. In this 
chapter, we have attempted to identify some of the major 
components of social constructionism, followed by a brief 
outline of the work of some of the major workers on 
stigma, and then highlighted three areas in which health 
care staff may contribute towards the stigmatisation of 
others. By employing these three areas, social 
constructionism, stigma and health care settings, we hope 
that we have gone some small way to revealing the 
complexity of a cultural mosaic that is constructed of many 
elements. The first involves the fact that we are first and 
foremost socialised individuals in the society to which we 
belong, long before we become professionalised members of 
our chosen discipline. Our professional values and ethics 
may well be at odds with our personal ones and create a 
tension and, although we may like to think that we can 
bracket off our personal views in order to operate with our 
professional ones, sometimes this fails. Furthermore, this 
situation is further compounded when we add to the 
analysis of the social dimension cultural values, which 
again may conflict with our personal and professional 
standards. 
In conclusion, there are a number of measures that 
ought to be undertaken by all involved in the 
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stigmatisation process, and not just health care 
professionals. The first, we would argue, is to reveal to 
ourselves our role in the process of stigmatisation and not 
to deny it. This requires a self-reflective approach to our 
thoughts and actions, and it can be a painful endeavour. 
However, it is fundamental to the change process. The 
second is to see people beyond a mere label and to “know” 
them as individuals. Empathy is required for us to be able 
to identify with them. Thirdly, we need to check our 
thoughts against our actions, to see if there is a 
contradiction between them and to establish if we are 
thinking and doing different things. Finally, for now, we 
should educate and train our professionals to identify 
areas in practice that are creating and maintaining stigma 
and to provide them with the skills and expertise to change 
this. Stigma, discrimination and prejudice have no place in 
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